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STRENGTH ASSESSMENT OF THE
COMMAND AND GENERAL SUPPORT
PORTION OF THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES

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**STRENGTH ASSESSMENT OF THE COMMAND AND
GENERAL SUPPORT PORTION OF THE
SOVIET ARMED FORCES**

This document was prepared by the
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Director, Defense Intelligence Agency.

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(U) TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
Summary	iii
Discussion	1
Outlook	4
Appendix I -- Definitions	5
Distribution List	7

SECRET

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SUMMARY

1. (C) A recent reassessment of the command and general support portion of the Soviet armed forces indicates that a significantly greater number of personnel are assigned to it than heretofore assessed. The increased number comprises those individuals assigned to the Ministry of Defense and service staffs as well as to the supply, research, training, and other activities which are needed as a sustaining base for the Soviet armed forces. It does not include personnel assigned to the field forces and, generally speaking, the operational subordination of these individuals is "above" front, military district, and comparable echelons. Because they are almost all located within the USSR, the impact of this new assessment on MBFR is not significant.
2. (S) The new total of 1,553,250 is about 800,000 more than the previous assessment and increases the assessed strength of the Soviet armed forces to almost 5 million men. It has a potential impact on costing studies -- at least \$8 billion in pay and allowances alone.
3. (C) The new figures are the preliminary result of a recent reassessment project and should not be regarded as a final assessment. Various parts will be further refined through additional research and analysis and some of the subtotals will probably change. The final product, however, will continue to indicate that the strength of the Soviet armed forces is greater than previously assessed.

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DISCUSSION

1. (C) A project was recently undertaken to provide an improved assessment of manpower strength of the command and general support portion of the Soviet armed forces for inclusion in the Defense Intelligence Projections for Planning (DIPP), Section VII. This portion of the Soviet armed forces includes those individuals assigned to the Ministry of Defense and service staffs as well as to the supply, research, training, and other activities which are needed as a sustaining base for the armed forces. Such individuals are not assigned to the field forces and, generally speaking, their operational subordination is "above" front, military district, and comparable echelons.
2. (S) The resulting assessment totals 1,553,250, distributed in the following manner:

COMMAND & GENERAL SUPPORT MANPOWER SOVIET ARMED FORCES 21 AUGUST 1974

Ministry of Defense & Force Hqs.	67,000
Research & Development	54,500*
Training	498,000
Intelligence	60,500
Military Assistance	12,000
Civil Defense	8,000
Military Equipment Procurement	2,000
Military Publishers	2,250
Service Support	849,000
(Voyenkomats)	65,500
Zone of the Interior Supply	47,500
Medical	20,000
Signal	5,000
Transportation	200,000
Construction	500,000**
Miscellaneous	11,000)
	<u>1,553,250</u>

*The extent of military participation in R&D is a matter of dispute. Some analysts believe it is relatively slight. Additional study of the matter is underway and this figure should be considered subject to change.

**In periods of nonhostility, the Soviets employ a varying percentage of their construction forces in nonmilitary projects. However, the total force in being should be considered a part of the sustaining military base because all construction personnel are available for military-related duties and would probably be utilized in such a capacity during hostilities or periods of national emergency.

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3. (S) The new assessment is significantly higher (about 800,000) than previous ones. It increases the assessed strength of the Soviet armed forces to almost 5 million men. It has a potential impact on costing studies -- at least \$8 billion in pay and allowances alone. However, its impact on MBFR is not significant because almost all of these personnel are located within the Soviet Union.
4. (C) The size of the increase must be considered as a product of the reassessment rather than an indication that the Soviets have increased the strength of their armed forces.
5. (S) Although the new total means an increase in manpower requirements for the Soviet armed forces, it is still compatible with the availability of draft-age manpower. For example, a force of 5 million men would annually require about 76% of the available 18-year-old males to sustain it.
6. (C) It must be emphasized, however, that the new figure should not be regarded as a final assessment. Ongoing efforts are expected to result in further refinements. DIA and CIA are planning a long-term joint project to this end. Some of the subtotals will probably change, and the overall total may also increase.
7. (C) The cited reassessment project was accomplished by having interested offices within DIA furnish to a single project officer improved assessments of various parts of the command and general support portion of the Soviet armed forces together with statements of the methodologies used. These were accomplished by component forces (Ground, Navy, Air, Rocket, and PVO Strany) wherever possible. Within the 33 subtotals* that comprise the grand total, there are broad variations in methodologies and confidence factors. However, on an overall basis, the total current assessment is based on better methodologies and on substantially more evidence than earlier ones. In addition, more success has probably been achieved by including a larger portion of the Soviet military's sustaining base than what had previously been counted.
8. (C) In most instances, analysts have attempted to define those areas they were assessing and then make a determination as to the best methodology. In some cases the choice of methodology was necessarily arbitrary. In other cases, generally recognized ratios were used in the calculations. In still other cases, extensive use was made of intelligence data and official studies to make calculations of manning levels in the various activities concerned.

*Examples of these subtotals would be the number of ground forces personnel assigned to the Ministry of Defense and Force Hqs, the number of naval personnel in the Training category, etc.

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9. (C) In the course of the reassessment, various gaps and problems were noted:

a. As footnoted earlier, the extent of military participation in R&D is a matter of dispute. Some analysts feel it is relatively slight.* Additional study is underway and the current figure should be viewed as subject to change.

b. Some of the areas are simply in need of further work and should be viewed as "incomplete" and liable to change. These include the Ministry of Defense, Intelligence, Military Assistance, and several subcategories of the service-support grouping, including Medical, Signal, and Transportation.

c. The definitions and the various parts making up the broad command and general support category are probably not clear to all interested offices. There are probably instances of inconsistencies between the services in terms of deciding what activity to count in a given category.

d. The categorization within the command and general support portion is possibly not the best possible breakdown. For this reassessment, the categories of Civil Defense, Military Equipment Procurement, and Military Publishers have been added, as was the service-support subcategory of "miscellaneous." These additions were made in an effort to insure that a maximum portion of the sustaining base of the Soviet military was actually being counted. However, there may be some valid arguments for rearranging these categories or making further additions.

*In this context, a distinction should be made between those military personnel actually engaged in R&D itself and those involved in test range support. The manpower R&D category includes both.

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OUTLOOK

1. (C) This appraisal has indicated that the number of personnel assigned to the command and general support portion of the Soviet armed forces is greater than previously believed and that further work is underway to refine the overall estimate.
2. (U) The problems of definition and categorization are being resolved and efforts are being made to develop new methodologies. Intelligence Collection Requirements (ICR's) are being prepared to address some of the gaps that have become apparent in the course of the reassessment process.
3. (C) It is probable that more of the sustaining base of the Soviet armed forces will be counted than what had previously been included. In the past there has been an understandable tendency to focus on the operational elements, at the expense of the sustaining base. This emphasis is being changed for the purpose of this project.
4. (S) An increased assessment will also establish a more logical demand for conscripts. The prior strength figure for the total Soviet armed forces required only approximately 50% of those eligible to serve terms of service as conscripts. This is not in accordance with the Soviet law requiring universal military service nor with much intelligence data that indicates a full compliance with this law. It also does not conform to more modest appraisals suggesting that at least 70% of Soviet youth see military service as conscripts.
5. (C) In any event, a final total should indicate that the strength of the Soviet armed forces is greater than that previously assessed.

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(C) APPENDIX I -- DEFINITIONS

COMMAND AND GENERAL SUPPORT: Military personnel assigned to the Ministry of Defense and service staffs as well as to the supply, research, training, and other activities which are needed as a sustaining base for the Soviet armed forces. It does not include personnel assigned to the field forces and, generally speaking, the operational subordination of these individuals is "above" front, military district, and comparable echelons.

Ministry of Defense and Force Hqs.: The staff of the Ministry of Defense, the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, the various directorates and headquarters of the major force components. Does not include the Chief of Intelligence Directorate or the Military Publishing Directorate, which are counted elsewhere.

Research and Development: Military personnel involved in defense or defense-related research and development activities/programs.

Training: Staff, faculty, support troops, and students at commissioning schools, branch academies, and advanced academies. Includes a portion of the staff, faculty, and support troops of the Suvorov and Nakhimov Schools. Includes faculty members and support personnel conducting reserve officer training at institutions of higher learning in the Soviet Union. Includes nondivisional troops in training and their trainers. Does not include those in the training divisions, since men in these divisions are included in the General Purpose Ground Forces. Does not include personnel in the Chief Intelligence Directorate (GRU) Schools, since they are included in the Intelligence category.

Intelligence: Personnel assigned to the Chief Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, and those operationally subordinate to it. Includes GRU Schools. Includes military attaches. Does not include any Committee for State Security (KGB) personnel, even though some are performing intelligence functions that would be performed by U.S. military personnel in this country.

Military Assistance: Includes Soviet military personnel serving abroad as technicians and advisors in connection with the delivery, assembly, and maintenance of military equipment or the training of indigenous personnel.

Civil Defense: Military personnel involved in the Soviet civil defense program on a full-time basis.

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Military Equipment Procurement: Military personnel assigned to defense industries to insure quality control of production.

Military Publishers: Military personnel assigned to the Military Publishing Directorate at the Ministry of Defense; those assigned as editors, staff members, and correspondents of military journals and newspapers; and those few assigned to the military departments of newspapers such as Pravda and Izvestia.

Service Support: Personnel not included elsewhere who also provide support to the military establishment as a whole. It is broken into the following subcategories: voyenkomats, Zone of the Interior supply, medical, signal, transportation, construction, and miscellaneous. Each of these subcategories is defined as follows:

Voyenkomats: The military personnel staffing the voyenkomats or military commissariats. Generally speaking, these are found in each political-administrative subdivision within the Soviet Union. They have responsibilities in regard to the registration and induction of conscripts; the registration, training, and administration of reservists; the mobilization of personnel and other resources; and probably more limited responsibilities in regard to preinduction military training.

Zone of the Interior Supply: Staffs and support personnel of the supply facilities subordinate to the Ministry of Defense.

Medical: Military personnel working in Soviet medical facilities. Does not include those in medical battalions of combat divisions, since these are included in the General Purpose Ground Forces. Does not include those in the Kirov Medical Academy, since they are included elsewhere.

Signal: The military personnel working in signal facilities subordinate to the Ministry of Defense.

Transportation: Military personnel concerned with rail, highway, and river transportation, including those personnel assigned to movement-control elements on a round-the-clock basis and the railroad troops.

Construction: Military personnel assigned to military construction detachments.

Miscellaneous: Military personnel not accounted for elsewhere; e.g., those in sports battalions, bands and orchestras, officer's clubs, military trade centers, etc.

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